Predicting Court Outcomes through Political Preferences: The Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993 by Ramseyer, J. Mark
RAMSEYER IN FINAL2.DOC 5/5/2009 4:10:36 PM 
 
PREDICTING COURT OUTCOMES 
 THROUGH POLITICAL PREFERENCES:  
THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT 
 AND THE CHAOS OF 1993 
J. MARK RAMSEYER† 
ABSTRACT 
  Empiricists routinely explain politically sensitive decisions of the 
U.S. federal courts through the party of the executive or legislature 
appointing the judge. That they can do so reflects the fundamental 
independence of the courts. After all, appointment politics will predict 
judicial outcomes only when judges are independent of sitting 
politicians. Because Japanese Supreme Court justices enjoy an 
independence similar to that of U.S. federal judges, I use judicial 
outcomes to ask whether Japanese premiers from different parties 
have appointed justices with different political preferences. 
  Although the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governed Japan 
for most of the postwar period, it temporarily lost power in the mid-
1990s. Elsewhere, Professor Eric Rasmusen and I asked whether the 
administration of the lower courts changed during this non-LDP 
hiatus. Here, I explore whether the supreme court changed. More 
specifically, I ask whether the non-LDP premiers appointed supreme 
court justices with different policy preferences. I find that they did not. 
INTRODUCTION 
In universities, scholars try hard to understand why judges decide 
cases the way they do. In the United States, we find that (in some 
subsets of cases) we can predict the way federal judges decide cases 
through proxies for their political preferences. Most obviously, 
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sometimes we can predict their decisions through the party of their 
appointing president or legislature.1 
These studies work because federal judges are independent and 
human. In conducting them, we use standard social scientific tools. 
And social science explains how judges act because it concerns human 
behavior—and judges are, after all, human beings. As Judge Richard 
Posner put it, they are “all-too-human workers, responding as other 
workers do to the conditions of the labor market in which they 
work.”2 In a 1993 essay, Posner asked, what do judges maximize?3 We 
in the academy may disagree about the details, but few of us would 
quarrel with his bottom line: the same thing everybody else does.4 
Others have sometimes been less sympathetic. When Professor 
Richard Revesz used the party of the appointing president to predict 
voting patterns on the D.C. Circuit,5 Judge Harry Edwards declared 
war: it was time to “refute the heedless observations of academic 
scholars who misconstrue and misunderstand the work of . . . judges.”6 
When Professors Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller characterized 
dissenting judges as whistleblowers,7 he dismissed their piece as an 
“absurd” bit “of sheer speculation.”8 
But perhaps the D.C. judge doth protest too much. And perhaps 
he also misses a bit of the point. Scholars like Professors Revesz, 
Cross and Tiller can predict judicial votes through political variables 
 
 1. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 219, 217–22 (2002) (discussing “the impact of presidential 
regimes on the Court’s behavior”); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of 
Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1651 (1998) (“[S]ocial 
scientists have discovered that the political party of the appointing President is a good proxy for 
a justice’s attitudes.”); Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice 
on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1285–87 (2005) (discussing “[t]he use 
of political party to identify the median Justice”); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, 
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 
559–62 (1989) (using newspaper editorials to measure judges’ values and then finding a 
correlation between those values and Supreme Court votes). 
 2. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 7 (2008). 
 3. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1993). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1717, 1718–19 (1997). 
 6. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1335, 1335 (1998). 
 7. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998). 
 8. Edwards, supra note 6, at 1337. 
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precisely because of the fundamental independence of the federal 
courts. Were courts not independent of sitting politicians, judges 
could not costlessly indulge their political biases. And if they could 
not indulge them at low cost, they would not indulge them often. That 
they act politically in political cases simply reflects their essential 
independence from incumbent politicians. 
I hesitate to stress the point more strongly. One thoughtful 
reader of an earlier draft described the point as “old hat.” All sensible 
legal scholars know this, he assured me. I take his point. Rather than 
push the point further, I simply use it to ask how aggressively leftist 
Japanese politicians tried to assert control over the courts during their 
time in power in the mid-1990s. 
Unlike their lower-court colleagues,9 Japanese Supreme Court 
justices enjoy politically independent careers. Once appointed, they 
serve until age seventy—and effectively face no incentives tied to 
their incomes, wealth, or careers.10 Accordingly, I use their opinions 
to explore the way Japanese politicians try (or do not try) to assert 
control over the courts. 
For this exercise, I turn to the few short years in the mid-1990s 
when three reformist prime ministers briefly broke the hold of what 
had been the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). To ask whether 
these three tried to transform the courts, I ask whether the justices 
they appointed wrote different opinions from LDP appointees. 
Because politicians primarily control the Japanese lower courts 
 
 9. For discussion of the political management of Japanese lower courts, see generally J. 
MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003) [hereinafter RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, 
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Political 
Uncertainty’s Effect on Judicial Recruitment and Retention: Japan in the 1990s, 35 J. COMP. 
ECON. 329 (2007) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect]; J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan After the 
Political Upheaval of 1993, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1879 (2006) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Rasmusen, 
Case for Managed Judges]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges 
So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001) [hereinafter 
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japanese Judges]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the 
Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2001) [hereinafter Ramseyer & 
Rasmusen, Japanese Conviction Rate]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the 
Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (1999) [hereinafter Ramseyer & 
Rasmusen, Japanese Taxpayer]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence 
in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997) [hereinafter 
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Judicial Independence]. 
 10. Saibansho ho [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 50. 
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through the supreme court,11 a premier who hoped to change the 
courts would have stacked the supreme court with justices who shared 
his reformist instincts. Those instincts, in turn, would have reflected a 
different set of policy preferences from those of the LDP appointees. 
Given the institutional independence of the supreme court, those 
different policy preferences would have been observable in the 
opinions the justices wrote. Were they? 
I begin by discussing the ties between career incentives and 
judicial independence (Part I). I explain Japanese court structure 
(Parts II and III), and the political turmoil of 1993 (Part IV). I 
conclude by testing whether the LDP and reformist justices wrote 
different opinions (Part V). 
I.  INDEPENDENCE 
A. Within Markets 
Few scholars would try to use ideological or political variables to 
predict the way corporate CEOs run their businesses. It is not that 
CEOs do not hold strong preferences. Like most humans, they hold 
preferences over a wide range of issues. And like most, they bring 
these preferences to their jobs. 
Nonetheless, scholars seldom try to use ideological or political 
preferences to explain the way CEOs do their jobs. Even when CEOs 
hold such preferences over precise issues a business faces, scholars 
ignore them. They ignore them because they do not matter: the 
preferences do not explain much that CEOs do. 
The reason is simple—CEOs operate under market constraints. 
There are exceptions, to be sure. Environmentalist executives may 
locate politically congenial careers in “green” technologies. Leftist 
financiers may market “social choice” mutual funds. Religiously 
driven managers may run church nonprofits. 
Yet within most industries, market competition prevents 
executives from much indulging their ideological and political biases. 
Ultimately, CEOs run their firms within the confines of capital, labor, 
and service and product markets. If they choose a strategy for 
ideological rather than economic reasons, they risk losing customers. 
 
 11. For a discussion of these mechanisms, see supra Part II.B. Note, however, that 
politicians could refuse to confirm lower-court judges at the end of their ten-year terms. 
Saibansho ho [Court Act], art. 40(3). This is rarely observed. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, 
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 8. 
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Left on their own, they risk running their firm out of business. 
Fundamentally, incumbent CEOs do not maximize economic returns 
because they “believe” in those returns more strongly than they 
believe in ideology or politics. They maximize economic returns 
because competitive markets weed them out if they do anything else. 
B. Within Institutions 
Scholars find politics similarly irrelevant within tightly run 
organizations. Even in organizations insulated from economic 
markets, scholars may find employee political preferences mostly 
beside the point. Take a think tank owned by Party A. A maintains 
the institute to promote its own policies. It does not want its research 
staff using it to promote the policies of rival Party B. 
Given this environment, institute employees who championed 
anything other than Party A policies would find themselves at a dead 
end. In general, the institute would not promote them as rapidly as 
their peers. It would not pay them as generously. Should they 
complete a study that recommended Party B policies, it would tend 
not to publish it. Whatever private preferences these employees 
might hold, their published work will tend to endorse A’s policies. 
Even scholars who knew the employees’ private preferences would 
seldom find them relevant. 
Crucial to this equilibrium is Party A’s power potentially to 
intervene in internal institute affairs.12 A will actually intervene in 
matters only occasionally, and only when it needs to demonstrate its 
power and control. For as long as A can intervene, it will not need 
actually to do so. Rather than risk A’s punishment, incumbent 
employees will promote A’s positions on their own. Incumbent 
employees would likely not hire an outspoken Party B follower who 
applies for work. Knowing that A had the power to intervene in 
personnel matters, few B partisans would bother applying for the job 
anyway. They realize the institute will tend not to promote them, not 
to pay them well, and not to publish the studies they write. Rather 
than apply to the institute, they will opt for more gratifying work 
elsewhere. 
 
 12. See Randall L. Calvert, Mark J. Moran & Barry R. Weingast, Congressional Influence 
over Policy Making: The Case of the FTC, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 493, 514–17 
(Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987). 
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C. Within Courts 
1. Independence.  Political preferences explain judicial decisions 
in the U.S. federal courts precisely because—by Constitution, by 
statute, and by custom—politicians have insulated them from the 
usual “high-powered” incentives that CEOs and think-tank 
employees face. Federal judges can decide cases as they please, and 
suffer no ill effect. Suppose they write an opinion that displeases the 
president or the Chief Justice or the attorney general or the Speaker 
of the House. They will not earn a lower salary. They will not miss a 
promotion,13 or find their opinions denied publication. Their court is 
even less likely to go out of business. Precisely because politicians do 
not punish a judge for indulging private preferences,14 a scholar can 
sometimes use those preferences to predict how a judge will decide. 
2. Dependence.  By contrast, suppose a powerful politician (say, 
the prime minister in a parliamentary government) controlled the 
courts more closely. Suppose he hired subordinates to monitor the 
way judges behave. Suppose he controlled resources (like pay scale 
assignments) that judges valued. And suppose he used the control to 
promote personal political preferences. 
Within this judicial environment, scholars could seldom predict 
judicial behavior through judicial preferences. In this environment, 
heterodox judges who indulged their private preferences would find 
their careers stalled. They might not be appointed to prestigious 
posts. They might find their salaries frozen. They might not see their 
opinions published. Realizing the potential cost of heterodoxy, most 
such judges would keep their preferences to themselves. And 
contemplating a life of enforced compliance, many more heterodox 
jurists would opt for life in the private bar instead. 
As a result, a judge’s political preferences will help predict 
judicial decisions only when politicians keep the courts independent 
 
 13. U.S. judges, however, are not indifferent to the possibility of being appointed to a more 
prestigious court. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What’s 
“Unconstitutional” About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 193 (1991) 
(finding evidence “consistent with the hypothesis that judges are more likely to follow the 
Administration’s wishes when facing the prospect of a promotion to an appeals court position”). 
 14. For a discussion of why U.S. politicians find it advantageous to do so, see TOM 
GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN 
CASES 21–33 (2003); F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial 
Independence?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 712, 712 (2004); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling 
(In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 741–42 (1994). 
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of themselves. Should politicians do so, a judge will find it relatively 
costless to decide cases according to private preferences. In the 
routine business of court decisionmaking, he will seldom focus on 
those preferences. After all, few judges hold heterodox beliefs 
(whatever those might be) about traffic accident or consumer debt 
claims. In the unusual but politically newsworthy cases of 
constitutional moment, however, judges may indeed disagree with 
each other about how to decide a case. Those disagreements, in turn, 
will track their private political preferences. 
Hence the moral: where politicians keep the courts independent, 
court outcomes will tend to track private judicial preferences; where 
politicians do not do so, those private preferences simply will not 
matter. 
II.  THE JAPANESE LOWER COURTS15 
A. The Incentives 
Remarkably closely, this account of the Party A think tank 
captures the internal dynamics of the Japanese lower courts. For most 
of the past half-century, the courts recruited their lower-court judges 
from (what was until recently) the sole national law school, the Legal 
Research & Training Institute (LRTI). In a typical year, they hired 
seventy to one hundred new judges.16 These men and women (in 1998, 
81 percent were still men)17 then served a series of renewable ten-year 
terms. The courts almost always renewed those terms,18 and most 
judges quit a few years before the mandatory retirement age of sixty-
five.19 
 
 15. I take the general description below from RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 7–25. For an alternative (but largely consistent) 
general description, see generally John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, 
Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 
2007). 
 16. See ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN [OVERVIEW OF CAREERS OF ALL JUDGES] 
(Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai ed., 4th ed. 2004) (collecting data on all judges, by year). 
 17. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1886 tbl.3. 
 18. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 8. 
 19. Saibansho ho [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 50 (setting the mandatory 
retirement age at sixty-five); J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, 
JAPAN’S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 154 tbl.8.1 (1993) (demonstrating the practice of early 
retirement). 
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During their careers, lower-court judges moved from post to post 
and city to city, usually at three-year intervals.20 Some posts carried 
more prestige than others. Among the most coveted were those with 
administrative power: chief judgeships, for example, or positions in 
the judicial administrative headquarters known as the Supreme Court 
Secretariat.21 Among the least desirable were the branch offices and 
family courts.22 
Similarly, some cities offered more appeal than others. Like 
other professionals, most Japanese judges preferred to live in the 
urban centers.23 There, they found the best preparatory schools for 
their children and the greatest amenities for themselves.24 Among 
those centers, most judges preferred Tokyo, if not Tokyo then Osaka, 
and if not Osaka then one of the regional centers.25 Should a Tokyo 
judge find himself posted to a small town, he typically left his family 
in Tokyo.26 He moved there alone, and then prayed for a 
reassignment to Tokyo three years hence. 
And some judges earned more than others, even more than 
others of the same age. Granted, Article 80 of the Constitution 
declares that “judges of the inferior courts shall receive . . . adequate 
compensation which shall not be decreased.”27 But to protect against 
pay cuts is one thing. To guarantee uniform increases is quite another. 
Subject to minor qualifications, all U.S. federal judges on the courts 
of appeals earn the same pay. As life-long employees, Japanese 
judges do not. They start their careers at low pay.28 If they climb the 
pay scale rapidly they will in time earn attractive salaries, but the 
Constitution does not guarantee a rapid climb. By controlling the 
pace at which they climb the scale, the courts can use the highest of 
the high-powered incentives to control the way their judges behave. 
 
 20. RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 19, at 156. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 11. 
 24. Id. at 11–12. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 12. 
 27. KENPÕ, art. 80. 
 28. For the pay scale as of the late 1980s, see RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 19, 
at 155 tbl.8.2. 
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B. Control 
1. Administrative Ties.  Decisions about which judge to post in 
which position to which city at what pay grade are controlled by the 
judges in the Secretariat.29 These judges too hold standard lower-court 
appointments and serve in the Secretariat for the standard three-year 
term—but the Secretariat is not a standard post. Instead, it is among 
the fairest posts of them all. Judges named to the Secretariat are 
judges in a hurry. Typically, they will move in and out of the most 
coveted Tokyo and Osaka jobs, rotate through a series of increasingly 
prestigious appointments, and cap their careers as a district court 
chief judge or high (that is, intermediate appellate) court president 
(that is, chief judge).30 
At the Secretariat, judges decide the personnel questions that 
determine their colleagues’ careers. In doing so, they answer to the 
Secretariat’s own Secretary General. The Secretary General too is a 
career judge, typically in his fifties. After running the Secretariat for 
several years, he will be named President of the Tokyo or Osaka High 
Court (there are seven high courts, but these presidencies are the 
most avidly desired). Often, he will then be appointed a justice to the 
supreme court itself. 
The secretary general answers to the supreme court chief justice. 
Put conversely, the chief justice monitors the secretary general; the 
secretary general supervises the judges staffing the Secretariat; and 
the Secretariat judges make the decisions that determine the fate of 
their peers in the lower courts.31 
2. Political Ties.  The ruling LDP does indeed control the 
Japanese lower courts. Formally, it controls the courts indirectly—
mostly through its power to appoint the fifteen supreme court 
justices, including the administratively crucial chief justice.32 The LDP 
controls the cabinet, after all, and the cabinet selects the fifteen 
justices to the court.33 To avoid the “Harry Blackmun problem,” it 
names its justices late in their lives. Appoint a forty-five-year-old 
justice, after all, and risk ongoing changes in political beliefs several 
times before retirement (though Justice Blackmun himself was over 
 
 29. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, 
at 9–13. 
 30. For a comparison of two judicial careers, see id. at 14. 
 31. Saibansho ho [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 53. 
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sixty). To mitigate this risk, the LDP can and does appoint justices 
close to their mandatory retirement at age seventy. From 1983 
through 1992, it named twenty-six men to the supreme court. It 
named one at age sixty, one at sixty-one, one at sixty-two, and the rest 
between sixty-three and sixty-eight (with a mean of 64.3).34 
Through the Diet, the LDP can also constrain the ability of the 
judges to make law. Japan maintains a parliamentary system of 
government. For much of the postwar period, Japanese voters elected 
enough legislators from the LDP for the party to field cabinets 
without a coalition.35 If heterodox judges tried to shape the case law, 
the party stood ready to reverse them through legislation.36 Even were 
higher courts not to overturn the judges’ opinions on appeal (and 
usually they would), the legislature could vitiate their prospective 
impacts by statute. 
C. Quality and Quantity 
1. Quality Control.  With this control, the LDP does not 
primarily manipulate the political complexion of judicial opinions. 
After all, most opinions have no serious political complexion to 
manipulate. Instead, the LDP offers voters high quality. It routes the 
rare politically loaded disputes out of the courts, and (through the 
Secretariat) induces the courts to handle the remaining “ordinary” 
cases expeditiously, intelligently, honestly, and consistently.37 
Japanese judges resolve most cases with dispatch. Despite having 
many fewer judges per capita than the United States, the Japanese 
courts decide cases at the pace of the high-quality federal courts in 
 
 32. For a detailed discussion of this and other potential mechanisms of control, see 
RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 19, at 152–53, 161–81. 
 33. KENPÕ, art. 79; Saibansho ho [Court Act], art. 39. 
 34. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1882 tbl.1, 1883 
tbl.2. 
 35. RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 19, at 19 fig.2.2. 
 36. See McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
105, 112 (2006) (“[T]he more closely aligned and coordinated are the political branches, the 
more likely they are to agree on policy outcomes, which enables them to reduce the number of 
issues on which the Court can exercise meaningful independent discretion.”). 
 37. This is an evaluation with which Haley apparently agrees. See Haley, supra note 15, at 
120–21 (describing the effect of the “shadow of potential political intrusion” on judges). For 
discussion of Haley’s work, see Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants?: 
Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421, 441–54 (2005). 
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the United States.38 According to court insiders, the Secretariat 
maintains this pace by collecting docket-clearance rates on all judges 
and using them to reward and punish. Unfortunately, the rates are 
not public. The (plausibly correlated) rates at which judges write 
published opinions are indeed public, however, and judges who write 
more publishable opinions per year do find themselves appointed to 
the better posts.39 
Second, Japanese judges decide like cases similarly. Probably, 
the Secretariat rewards its judges for following precedent. After all, 
Japanese courts are nothing if not predictable. Curiously, however, 
judges who publish opinions that are reversed on appeal do not 
visibly suffer in their careers.40 In fact, though, the case reporters print 
only a small minority of decisions,41 and perhaps a judge who writes 
publishable opinions that are reversed on appeal is still producing 
higher-quality output than a judge who publishes nothing at all. 
In any event, Japanese courts work hard to maintain consistency 
across opinions. The Secretariat occasionally operates workshops on 
frequently litigated legal issues. And, by way of example, Daniel 
Foote has nicely documented how judges deliberately engineered 
consistency to the booming traffic-accident litigation in the 1970s.42 
2. The Returns to Talent.  The Secretariat maintains this high 
level of quality by rewarding talent. Put most pedantically, it appoints 
to the most desirable posts and cities those judges who exhibit traits 
most closely correlated with the diligence and intelligence necessary 
to run high-quality courts. Put more colloquially, the Secretariat 
rewards the smart and hard working. 
Consider judicial backgrounds. Smart and hard-working judges 
tend to have been smart and hard-working students. And smart and 
hard-working students tend to do well on important exams. The 
 
 38. J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
APPROACH 140 tbl.6.1A, 141 tbl.6.1B (1999). 
 39. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, 
at 54 tbl.3.4, 67 tbl.4.2, 71 tbl.4.5, 90 tbl.5.3, 94 tbl.5.5 (describing the effects of opinion writing 
on judicial careers). 
 40. Id. at 76–80. 
 41. In 2000, for example, the district courts disposed of 530,000 civil cases. See  Tsujo dai 
Isshinjiken no Shukyoku Sojinin [Summary Court Statistics] (2006), http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
sihotokei/nenpo/pdf. Based on a search in the Hanrei taikei database, the public and private 
reporters together published 1452 district court opinions during that year. 
 42. Daniel H. Foote, Resolution of Traffic Accident Disputes and Judicial Activism in 
Japan, 25 L. JAPAN 19, 24–30 (1995). 
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qualities that enable students to score high on exams, in other words, 
also enable them as judges to handle cases quickly and accurately. 
And the judges who succeeded most prominently as students tend to 
succeed most prominently in the courts. 
First, the judges who attended the schools with the most selective 
entrance examinations enjoy the most successful careers. They begin 
at the most coveted courts. Throughout their career, they spend more 
time in prestigious assignments, and more time in the desirable cities. 
They climb the pay scale more rapidly. And they are more likely to 
conclude their careers with an appointment to a Chief Judgeship.43 
The private market generates an analogous result. Provided they 
practice in Tokyo, attorneys from the University of Tokyo earn the 
highest incomes. The university has long maintained the most 
restrictive entrance exam. Given the prestige of the courts, a high 
fraction of judges have traditionally come from the University of 
Tokyo.44 And just as University of Tokyo graduates on the bench tend 
to do better than their colleagues, University of Tokyo lawyers in the 
competitive private market in Tokyo tend to earn higher incomes 
than their counterparts from other universities.45 
Second, the judges who passed the LRTI entrance exam most 
quickly have the most successful careers. During most of the past 
half-century, the passage rate on the exam hovered in the 1–3 percent 
range.46 Most exam takers never passed, and the average lawyer 
finally passed it only after first failing six or seven times.47 Consistent 
again with the high prestige of the courts, the average judge passed it 
more quickly than the average lawyer: the average judge failed it 
“only” three to five times.48 But among the judges, those who failed it 
fewer times started at the best courts, spent more time in prestigious 
 
 43. For a description of this point, see generally RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9. 
 44. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect, supra note 9, at 335 tbl.1A. 
 45. Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Industrial Organization 
of the Japanese Bar 1 (Harvard Law & Econ., Discussion Paper No. 559, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=951622. 
 46. See id. (manuscript at 2) (describing the LRTI exam as one “that 97–99 percent of the 
applicants failed”). 
 47. Id. (manuscript at 8–9). 
 48. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect, supra note 9, at 335 tbl.1A. 
RAMSEYER IN FINAL2.DOC 5/5/2009  4:10:36 PM 
2009] JAPANESE JUDICIAL POLITICS 1569 
posts, spent more time in desirable cities, climbed the pay scale more 
rapidly, and more likely ended their careers as chief judges.49 
Again, the private market generates an analogous result. 
Whether in Tokyo or the smaller cities, the lawyers who passed the 
exam most quickly report the highest incomes later in their careers.50 
Passing exams requires intelligence and hard work, and those 
qualities are ones that employers and clients value. Whether on the 
market or in the courts, the smartest and hardest-working jurists 
enjoy the most successful careers. 
III.  POLITICS IN THE JAPANESE LOWER COURTS 
A. Structure 
Institutional control over Japanese lower courts may improve 
quality, but it also involves political motivations. The Secretariat does 
not just manipulate incentives to promote speed and accuracy. It also 
manipulates them to promote LDP policy. And precisely because the 
LDP—through the Secretariat—controls crucial incentives within the 
lower courts, scholars will find it hard to use the political preferences 
of individual lower-court judges to predict their decisions. 
Again, the controls are indirect. The LDP can appoint to the 
supreme court justices who share its political philosophy. Through 
that Chief Justice, it can monitor and control the Secretary General of 
the Secretariat. Through the secretary general, it can set the standards 
by which the Secretariat staff (judges all) reward and punish 
individual lower court judges. Through those standards, it can 
structure a judiciary in which the loyal do well and the heterodox 
suffer. Through its control over the Diet, it can reverse by statute any 
case law that a renegade judge might try to make. And because it can 
do all this, the heterodox will tend to avoid careers in the courts. For 
a card-carrying Marxist, a career in the Japanese courts is just not a 
whole lot of fun. 
In short, in Japanese lower courts, neither judicial output nor 
expressed judicial preferences will show much political variation. The 
case law will reflect LDP policies. The sitting judges will express LDP 
policies publicly. And most of those judges will even hold LDP 
policies privately. Regress the case law on potential indices of judicial 
 
 49. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 42 
tbl.2.7, 53 tbl.3.3, 54 tbl.3.4, 75 tbl.4.7, 90 tbl.5.3, 92 tbl.5.4, 112 tbl.6.4. 
 50. Nakazato et al., supra note 45, at 17 tbl.3. 
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political preference, and insignificant results will usually follow. 
Although he characterizes the situation as showing independence, 
Professor John Haley nicely describes the mechanics at play: 
The potential for partisan or other political intervention motivates 
the judges assigned to judicial administration to be more vigilant 
than perhaps they might otherwise be to ensure that the judiciary 
enjoys the highest levels of public trust. Thus acceptability of judges 
to politicians has to be viewed in relation to the similar 
accountability of politicians to the public. . . . Individual judges thus 
function within the shadow of potential political intrusion. They 
cannot help but be aware that in adjudicating highly publicized, 
politically sensitive cases, they can be held professionally 
accountable for their decisions.51 
He then concludes, “Judges themselves, however, exercise the 
oversight, not politicians directly or indirectly.”52 In effect, Professor 
Haley describes “indirect” but straightforward—and potentially 
extremely effective—political oversight. 
B. Enforcement 
It was not always so. The current U.S.-imposed (formally Allied-
imposed) Constitution took effect on May 3, 1947 under conservative 
Shigeru Yoshida’s first cabinet. Fielding a coalition government, 
Socialist Tetsu Katayama replaced him a few days later, and held 
power for about ten months. In August of that year, he appointed the 
first fifteen justices to the court.53 
Back in power in March 1948, Yoshida did not immediately focus 
on the courts. He had other worries: inflation ran over 50 percent; the 
Americans had bombed the economy back to the 1930s; his 
conservative allies stood in disgrace; Allied occupiers were executing 
the military elite and planning massively to purge the political and 
business elite; the Americans intended to demand draconian 
 
 51. Haley, supra note 15, at 120–21; see also John O. Haley, 30 J. JAPANESE STUD. 235, 
239–40 (2004) (book review) (“[T]he actions of Japan’s senior judges can be readily explained 
by concern over any possible public perception of judicial corruption or incompetence or that 
judges might act out of partisan preference or extreme ideological commitment.”). 
 52. Haley, supra note 15, at 121. 
 53. NIHON KINDAI SHI JITEN [DICTIONARY OF MODERN JAPANESE HISTORY] 696–702 
(Kyoto daigaku bungakubu ed., 1958). 
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reparations and liquidate the 500 biggest Japanese firms.54 With crises 
like these, few prime ministers would have worried about enforcing 
any orthodoxy in the courts. 
Yet with the conservative government probably mandating only 
haphazard conformity, some jurists on the fringe left found the courts 
an attractive career. From the 1950s through the mid-1960s, a steady 
stream of jurists from the Communist-affiliated Young Jurists League 
(YJL) joined the courts. By 1968, about 12 percent of the incoming 
judges were YJL members.55 Only as the LDP extended its hold into 
the courts did leftist jurists begin to find them uncongenial. 
In time, the YJL judges would suffer career penalties. As the 
LDP strengthened its control over personnel matters, Professor Eric 
Rasmusen and I find that the YJL judges began to be posted to 
inferior positions. Talent and effort held constant, they found 
themselves named to less prestigious positions, and sent to less 
attractive cities.56 
When these politically heterodox judges tried to express their 
personal preferences in their work, they suffered. Granted, they 
seldom had reason to express those preferences. Most litigation 
involved no political issues of moment. But over the politically most 
sensitive disputes, the judges did have reason to indulge their politics. 
And when they wrote opinions that deviated from the position held 
by the LDP leadership, they suffered in their careers. For example, 
Professor Rasmusen and I find penalties in the careers of judges who 
1. Acquitted leftist political candidates prosecuted for violating the 
statutory ban on door-to-door canvassing;57 
 
 54. See generally Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Good Occupation (Harvard Law 
& Econ., Discussion Paper No. 514, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=729463 
(describing the general situation surrounding the Allied occupation of Japan). 
 55. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1886 tbl.3. 
 56. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 42 
tbl.2.7, 54 tbl.3.4, 90 tbl.5.3, 94 tbl.5.5, 112 tbl.6.4, 115 tbl.6.5. We also find that they climbed the 
pay scale more slowly than equally qualified conservative peers. Id. at 41 tbl.2.6. But see 
Kentaro Fukumoto & Mikitaka Masuyama, Judging Political Promotion of Judges: Survival 
Analysis, Split Population Model and Matching Method 1–24 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www-cc.gakushuin.ac.jp/~e982440/research/FKMM-APSA06.pdf (arguing 
that, although it is more difficult for the leftist judges to get on the track to a prestigious post, 
there is no evidence of discrimination with respect to the timing of promotion once they do get 
on the track). 
 57. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 
58–60; Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 283–85. 
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2. Upheld apportionment-based attacks on LDP electoral victories, 
during the years when the LDP relied on a rural base;58 
3. Upheld constitutional challenges to the Japanese military;59 
4. Enforced politically motivated injunctions against the 
government.60 
Disproportionately, these judges spent more time during the 
decade after writing the opinion in undesirable positions, and less 
time in more attractive ones. 
IV.  1993 
A. Change61 
It was the worst of times—at least for the LDP. 
After dominating politics for nearly four decades, the LDP 
entered the 1990s with a wide range of problems. To pay for its lavish 
pork-barrel projects, it had enacted a sales tax that alienated a broad 
swath of voters. Under U.S. pressure, it had imposed trade and 
investment controls that threatened key constituents. With the end of 
the Cold War, it had lost any urgency to its anticommunist agenda. As 
rural families migrated to the cities, it found its agricultural base 
increasingly irrelevant. When its famously relaxed approach to 
matters financial generated a series of bribery scandals, it lost key 
leaders. And as the country spiraled into recession, it could no longer 
even promise prosperity. 
Within this crisis, in 1993 old rivals decided to settle scores. One-
time LDP prime-ministerial candidate Ichiro Ozawa engineered a no-
confidence vote, quit the party, and organized a new organization 
around his old-time protégés. In the election that followed, he and his 
allies did well, while the rump LDP lost badly. The party’s rivals 
regrouped around Ozawa and another renegade LDP, politician 
Morihiro Hosokawa, and threw it out of power. 
 
 58. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 
68–73; Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japanese Judges, supra note 9, at 339 tbl.2. 
 59. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 
64–68; Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japanese Judges, supra note 9, at 338 tbl.1. 
 60. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 
73–76; Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japanese Judges, supra note 9, at 340 tbl.3. 
 61. See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1892–93; 
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect, supra note 9, at 332–33. 
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Championing a reformist agenda, Hosokawa took control. 
Ozawa remained the kingpin, however, and even as Prime Minister 
Hosokawa never escaped his influence. Within months, his coalition 
unraveled. His successor (ex-LDP politician Tsutomu Hata) lasted 
barely two months. 
In this chaos, the Socialists struck a deal with the LDP. Their 
leader, Tomiichi Murayama, became prime minister—the first 
Socialist to do so since Katayama. Murayama governed through a 
coalition that included the LDP, however, and even this arrangement 
quickly disintegrated. He implemented little of the Socialist agenda, 
and by 1996 the LDP was back in power. It has controlled the Cabinet 
ever since. 
Cabinets thus followed the following stages: (a) the LDP 
controlled the government from 1955 through July 1993; (b) 
Hosokawa, Hata, and Murayama followed in quick succession; and 
(c) the LDP returned to power in January 1996. At the supreme 
court: (a) Hosokawa appointed four justices; (b) Hata appointed 
none; and (c) Murayama appointed five justices. 
B. The Lower Courts 
Elsewhere, Professor Rasmusen and I explore the effect of the 
1993–96 turmoil on the lower courts. We find little to report. On the 
one hand, the courts retained their bias against leftist judges.62 Some 
of the YJL judges from the 1960s, for example, still served in the 
courts. During the decades leading up to 1993, they endured career 
penalties. Relative to their more conservative colleagues, they 
languished in less prestigious posts in less desirable cities. 
Much as the Hosokawa-Murayama cabinets might—
hypothetically—have tried to abolish this anti-leftist penalty, the bias 
survived the 1993 crisis. Had the reformists intervened in judicial 
personnel matters (or had the courts anticipated their intervention), 
the courts might have changed their relative treatment of YJL and 
non-YJL judges. They did not: indices of industry and intelligence 
held constant, after 1993 YJL judges continued to languish in less 
attractive posts.63 
 
 62. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1922–25. 
 63. On the other hand, the post-1993 courts may have found it marginally harder to retain 
and recruit the most talented jurists. If incumbent judges believed that nothing had changed in 
the wake of 1993, then (economic circumstances held constant) the courts should not have 
found it harder to retain them. If potential applicants believed that nothing had changed, then 
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V.  1993 AND THE SUPREME COURT 
A. The Issue 
The anti-leftist bias in the lower courts survived the 1990s. 
Apparently, the reformists did not successfully transform the courts. 
But did they try? 
Had the reformists wanted to change the lower courts, in part 
they would have worked through the supreme court. They would 
have found it hard. Although the cabinet controls the lower courts, it 
primarily (not exclusively) controls them through its power to appoint 
the supreme court associate justices (who police the case law through 
their power to reverse) and the chief justice (who supervises the 
secretary general). Not until September 1995 had the reformers 
named a majority to the court. And not until November 1995 had 
they named a chief justice. By January 1996, the LDP was back in 
power.64 
Perhaps, however, the reformists never seriously attempted to 
reform the courts. The lower courts would have changed radically 
only if the reformists had appointed transformative justices to the 
supreme court. Did they? 
Because supreme court justices serve until mandatory retirement 
at age seventy, they face few (if any) of the incentives that structure 
lower court careers. Once elected—to put it most bluntly—they are 
independent. Because of that independence, any political differences 
among them could appear in their opinions (as is the case in the U.S. 
federal courts). To test whether Hosokawa and Murayama tried to 
transform the lower courts, I thus ask whether the justices they 
appointed wrote different opinions from their predecessors. In 
Section B, I first outline the work and composition of the court.65 I 
then examine the opinions that the justices actually wrote,66 and the 
voting patterns they exhibited.67 
 
the courts should not have found it harder to recruit talent. Yet some evidence—weak to be 
sure—suggests that after 1993 the courts did find it harder to retain and recruit the most 
talented jurists. Apparently, conservative jurists saw too great a risk that reformist politicians 
might begin to restructure the courts to stay. Their leftist peers saw too small a chance to apply. 
See generally Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect, supra note 9 (describing the 
political influences on the composition of the judiciary in Japan in the 1990s). 
 64. ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 16, at 357–58. 
 65. See infra Part V.B. 
 66. See infra Part V.C. 
 67. See infra Part V.D. 
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B. Introduction 
Consider, first, some preliminary background. 
1. Workload. 
 a. Panels.  By statute, the Japanese Supreme Court hears most 
appeals in one of three five-justice panels. When a dispute raises the 
constitutionality of a statute or regulation, the court handles it en 
banc.68 When it concerns only legal (rather than constitutional) issues, 
the court handles it on one of the three panels. 
Such may be what the law requires, but the Japanese Supreme 
Court actually hears almost no cases en banc.69 In 1990, it published 
no en banc opinions at all. In 1995 it filed two and in 2000 one.70 
Whatever the statutory pretext, the Japanese Supreme Court disposes 
of nearly all its cases through its five-justice panels. 
 b. Discretionary Appeals.  By the terms of the Civil Procedure 
Code, the supreme court’s work should have fallen dramatically in 
1998. Until that year, the court heard all appeals—it exercised no 
certiorari-like discretion to decline a case.71 Since 1998, it can refuse 
to hear cases that raise merely legal—rather than constitutional—
issues.72 Only constitutional cases can it refuse to decline, and the data 
on en banc decisions suggest such constitutional cases simply do not 
exist. 
But if such is what the law implies, such is not what common 
sense demands. Before 1998, the court may not have had the 
discretion to dismiss an appeal, but it could (and often did, I have 
been assured in casual conversation) simply opine, “Affirmed for 
reasons given by the court below.” After 1998 the court may have the 
discretion not to hear an appeal, but it must (if it hopes to exercise 
that discretion intelligently) still review an appeal to decide whether it 
wants to dismiss it. Pre- or post-1998, the amount of work involved in 
deciding whether to write a serious opinion should have remained 
 
 68. Saibansho ho [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 10. 
 69. I take the number of opinions from a search of the Hanrei Taikei database. The 
database compiles the opinions published in all major private and public case reporters. It 
remains theoretically possible that the Court published other en banc opinions that no reporter 
bothered to compile. Given that most en banc Supreme Court opinions would be among the 
most newsworthy opinions in courts, this is highly unlikely. 
 70. See infra Table 1, Panel A: Opinions Published by the Supreme Court. 
 71. Minji sosho ho [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 29 of 1890, art. 394. 
 72. MINSOHÚ, art. 312(a), 317(b), 318. 
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roughly unchanged. And pre- or post-1998, the amount of work in 
actually writing the opinion about the disputes it does treat seriously 
should have remained unchanged as well. 
Table 1.  Selected Summary Statistics 
A. Opinions Published by Supreme Court 
Cases with at Least One  
Court Opinions Dissent Concurrence 
 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000 
Panel 1 76 42 56 1 1 7 0 0 3 
Panel 2 60 56 64 3 1 1 1 0 4 
Panel 3 67 70 54 3 0 1 2 5 3 
En banc 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Total 203 168 174 7 3 10 3 6 10 
 
B. Appeals Filed with the Supreme Court 
 1990 1995 2000 
Civil & Adm 3109 4219 6476 
Criminal 1913 1858 2901 
Total 5022 6077 9377 
 
C. Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court 
Justice Appointed Age University Career 
Predecessor 
Career 
Hosokawa Cabinet 
Hideo Chigusa 9/93 61 Tokyo U Judge Judge 
Shigeharu Negishi 1/94 61 Tokyo U Prosecutor Prosecutor 
Hisako Takahashi 2/94 66 Tokyo U Bureaucrat Bureaucrat 
Yukinobu Ozaki 2/94 64 Tokyo U Lawyer Lawyer 
Murayama Cabinet 
Shin’ichi Kaai 7/94 62 Kyoto U Lawyer Lawyer 
Mitsuo Endo 2/95 64 Hosei U Lawyer Lawyer 
Kazutomo Ijima 8/95 62 N.A. Prosecutor Prosecutor 
Hiroshi Fukuda 9/95 60 Tokyo U Bureaucrat Bureaucrat 
Masao Fujii 11/95 63 Kyoto U Judge Judge 
Sources: Hanrei taikei [Case Compendium] (Tokyo: Daiichi hoki, updated); 
Saiko saibansho jimuso kyoku, ed., Shiho tokei nempo [Legal Statistics 
Annual] (Tokyo: Hosokai, various years); Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai, 
ed., Zen saibankan keireki soran [Overview of Careers of All Japanese 
Judges] (Tokyo: Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai, 4th ed., 2004). 
And indeed, the number of cases in which the court writes a 
serious opinion has stayed approximately constant. From 1990 to 
1995, litigants increased the number of appeals they filed by about 20 
percent. From 1995 to 2000, they increased it by over 50 percent. 
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Despite the fact that the court had new legal authority to refuse their 
appeals, they filed half again as many appeals.73 
Table 2. Opinions by LDP and Reformist Justices: All Panels 
A. Summary Statistics 
 n 
Mean Maj.  
Ops. 
Mean 
Dissents 
Mean 
Concur. 
Private 
Reporter % 
All Off’l 
Reporters % 
Appointed by: 
LDP  28 161.14 1.43 1.36 9.46 69.47 
Hosokawa  4 173.25 1.25 1.50 6.32 72.36 
Murayama  5 191.40 1.60 1.80 2.84 62.36 
Background: 
Lawyer 13 159.46 2.38 1.62 8.21 68.91 
Prosecutor  5 178.60  .40 1.20 5.64 67.73 
Judge 12 163.33  .75  .92 9.45 70.31 
Other background  7 176.57 1.57 2.14 8.00 66.88 
 
B. Regressions 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1) Total 
Dissents 
(2) Total 
Concur. 
(3) Total 
Private Rptr. 
(4) Total Official 
Rptr. 
LDP Appointee -.099 (0.17) -.333 (0.46)  7.397 (3.10)***  3.292 (0.74) 
Lawyer 1.658 (2.60)**  .359 (0.46)  -.440 (0.17) -3.480 (0.73) 
Prosecutor -.317 (0.39)  .049 (0.05) -2.997 (0.91) -3.754 (0.61) 
Other backgrd  .863 (1.18) 1.012 (1.12)  -.756 (0.26) -5.078 (0.93) 
Decisions -.001 (0.18) -.008 (0.94)  .042 (1.43)  .674 (12.33)*** 
Adj. R2  .13 -.08  .17 .83 
 
Dependent Variable Dissent % Concur. % Priv. Rptr. % Off’l Rptr. % 
LDP Appointee  .017 (0.05)  .219 (0.33) 4.405 (2.97)***  2.351 (0.79) 
Lawyer 1.146 (3.06)***  .810 (1.15)  .159 (0.10) -1.366 (0.43) 
Prosecutor -.173 (0.35)  .156 (0.17) -1.671 (0.80) -2.148 (0.51) 
Other backgrd  .678 (1.54)  .742 (0.90)  .190 (0.10) -3.262 (0.87) 
Adj. R2  .21 -.07  .17  -.08 
Notes: The regressions include the 37 justices appointed between 1983 and 1995 other 
than the two Chief Justices (who have greater administrative responsibilities). For each 
Justice, I include all opinions published during his or her first three years on the bench. 
“Official Reporter” figures include all opinions published in any official reporter. 
“Private Reporter” figures include those opinions published in either of the two 
principal private reporters (Hanrei jiho or Hanrei taimuzu) but not in an official 
reporter. 
For appointments, the omitted variable is an appointment by one of the two reformist 
cabinets. For the background variables, the omitted variable is a background as a 
career judge. 
n = 35. *, **, ***: significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. All 
regressions include a constant term. 
Regressions are OLS, with t-statistics in parenthesis. 
Sources: See Table 1. 
 
 73. See infra Table 1, Panel B: Appeals Filed with the Supreme Court. 
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In fact, however, the court did not substantially change the 
number of serious opinions it issued. In 1990, it published about 200 
cases (some of those very short). It published about 170 in 1995, and 
about 170 in 2000.74 The number of appeals filed may have risen—but 
the number of opinions published stayed about the same. 
 c. Dissents.  Supreme court justices rarely write dissenting or 
concurring opinions. Lower court judges never do, but even supreme 
court justices write them only rarely. Of the 168 opinions in 1995, only 
three included any dissents. Of the 174 opinions in 2000, only 10 did.75 
What is more, the justices who did not come from careers in the 
lower courts or prosecutorial offices wrote most of the dissents. Of 
the thirty-seven justices appointed between 1983 and 1995, the former 
lawyers wrote a mean 2.38 dissents and 1.62 concurrences during their 
first three years on the bench; the former prosecutors wrote a mean 
0.40 dissents and 1.20 concurrences, and the former lower-court 
judges wrote a mean 0.75 dissents and 0.92 concurrences.76 
2. Background Careers.  The reformist governments of 
Hosokawa and Murayama appointed justices with the same 
backgrounds as did their predecessors. Fundamentally, they 
continued the customary (but not legally mandated) practice of 
maintaining professional slots. Justices who came from the 
professional judiciary they replaced with other professional judges. 
Former prosecutors they replaced with other prosecutors. And career 
lawyers they replaced with other lawyers.77 
A government intent on changing the political complexion of the 
courts would have done otherwise. Under the nearly four-decade-
long LDP rule, jurists sharing LDP policy preferences 
disproportionately would have self-selected into the bureaucracy and 
the courts. Those with opposition sympathies would have taken (and 
did take) jobs in the bar or on university faculties. A reformist hoping 
to stack the court with like-minded judges would thus have named 
more lawyers or professors. Neither Hosokawa nor Murayama did 
so.78 
 
 74. See infra Table 1, Panel A: Opinions Published by the Supreme Court. 
 75. See infra Table 1, Panel A: Opinions Published by the Supreme Court. 
 76. See infra Table 2, Panel A: Summary Statistics. For statistical significance, see infra 
Table 2, Panel B: Regressions. 
 77. See infra Table 1, Panel C: Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court. 
 78. See infra Table 1, Panel C: Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court. 
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3. Age at Appointment.  Had the reformists hoped to extend their 
influence in the courts beyond their expected tenure, they would have 
appointed young justices. American Presidents do this routinely, of 
course. John Roberts Jr. was fifty when appointed in 2005; Samuel 
Alito was fifty-five when appointed in 2006. Even Socialist Katayama 
in 1947 appointed some justices as young as fifty-three (the mean age 
was fifty-nine).79 
Hosokawa and Murayama did not do this. Hosokawa appointed 
his four at a mean age of 63.0 (range 61–66), and Murayama his five 
at 62.2 (range 60–64).80 Given that supreme court justices face 
mandatory retirement at age seventy, all Hosokawa-Murayama 
appointees were gone by 2005. 
4. University Background.  University background says nothing 
about politics. Among University of Tokyo alumni, reformist prime 
ministers could have chosen either capitalists or communists. The 
University of Tokyo regularly sends its graduates to the bureaucracy 
and the exchange-listed corporate ranks. But it counts many Marxists 
among its faculty and alumni as well—even the chair (as of late 2008) 
of the Japan Communist Party Central Committee, Kazuo Shii. 
In any event, Hosokawa and Murayama continued the 
meritocratic emphasis of their predecessors. Hosokawa chose all of 
his justices from the University of Tokyo. Of the four appointees on 
whom university background is public, Murayama took one from the 
University of Tokyo and two from its close competitor, the University 
of Kyoto.81 
C. Opinions Published 
In Panel B of Table 2, I ask whether the reformist-appointed 
justices wrote different opinions than their LDP-appointed colleagues 
did. Again, I take the thirty-seven justices named between 1983 and 
1995: twenty-eight were appointed by LDP prime ministers, four by 
Hosokawa, and five by Murayama. Because of their greater 
administrative workload, I exclude the two chief justices. For each 
justice, I examine the opinions they published during his first three 
years on the bench. 
 
 79. See ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 16. 
 80. See infra Table 1, Panel C: Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court. 
 81. See infra Table 1, Panel C: Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court. 
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In Column (1), I regress the number of dissents individual 
justices published against the cabinet that appointed them (the 
omitted category is appointment by Hosokawa or Murayama). I add 
additional variables for their professional backgrounds (the omitted 
category is judge) and the total number of decisions in which they 
participated. 
If the reformist-appointed justices decided cases differently than 
their LDP colleagues, they should have written more dissents (after 
all, they were in the minority during the first post-1993 years). They 
did not: the coefficient on LDP appointment is insignificantly 
different from 0. In a second set of regressions, I use as dependent 
variable the percentage (rather than number) of dissents a justice 
wrote (among his total output). The coefficient on LDP remains 
insignificant: reformist-appointed justices did not dissent more often 
than their predecessors. 
The LDP justices would have dominated the court most strongly 
during the first years of the Hosokawa administration. After all, they 
constituted the largest block during those early years. In other 
regressions (not reported), I disaggregate the Hosokawa and 
Murayama justices, and ask whether the former were most likely to 
dissent. They were not. 
In Column (2), I regress the number of concurrences (and 
percentage of concurrences) against a justice’s appointing cabinet. 
Again, the coefficient on LDP appointment is insignificant: the 
reformist appointees did not write more concurrences than the LDP 
appointees. 
The private case reporters print opinions their publishers find 
newsworthy, while the official reporters print opinions selected by 
Secretariat staff. During the reformist cabinets, lower-court judges 
hired during the LDP years still controlled the Secretariat. Suppose 
reformist-appointed justices wrote opinions that flouted LDP 
preferences. If they did, the major private reporters would have found 
them newsworthy, while the official reporters would have hesitated to 
grant them their imprimatur. 
In Column (3) I take as my dependent variable the number of 
opinions published in at least one of the two principal private 
reporters (Hanrei taimuzu or Hanrei jiho) but not in any of the 
official reporters. I then regress this count against the party that 
appointed the justice. Curiously, the coefficient on LDP-appointment 
is significantly positive: the LDP appointed justices were more likely 
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than their reformist colleagues to have opinions published by the 
major private but not official reporters. 
In Column (4), I regress the number of opinions published in an 
official reporter against the party that appointed the justice. The 
coefficient on the justice’s appointing party is insignificant: LDP-
appointed justices were no more likely than their reformist colleagues 
to obtain the imprimatur of official publication. 
D. Voting Alignments 
If the reformist-appointed justices brought a distinctive policy 
perspective to their work, they should have tended to vote as a block. 
Disproportionately, they should have voted with each other and 
against their LDP-appointed colleagues. 
To explore this hypothesis, in Table 3 I take all twelve en banc 
opinions published between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2002 
that included a dissenting or concurring opinion. As Panel A shows, 
both the LDP and the “reform” blocks of justices routinely split their 
votes. In general, a justice appointed by Hosokawa or Murayama 
seems as likely to have voted with the LDP justices as with the other 
Hosokawa-Murayama appointees. 
In Panel B, I report the correlation coefficients (and p-values) 
for a given justice’s vote and the percentage of other LDP-appointed 
or reform-appointed justices voting in the same direction.82 According 
to Panel B.1, any given LDP justice’s vote may be more strongly 
correlated with the votes of the reformist-appointed justices than with 
the other LDP appointees. According to Panel B.2, the correlation 
coefficients between any reformist-appointee’s vote and the 
percentage of LDP-appointees and reform-appointees voting in the 
same direction are indistinguishable. 
 
 82. For example, the correlation coefficient between a given LDP appointee’s vote for the 
majority and the percentage of other LDP justices who voted for the majority was -.04 
(p value = .7). The correlation coefficient between his vote for the dissent and the percentage of 
other LDP justices who voted for the dissent is -.05 (p value = .6). The discrepancy between the 
two correlation matrices comes from the fact that the percentages are of the other LDP justices, 
not all LDP justices. A concurrence is counted as a vote for the majority. 
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Table 3.  Opinions by LDP and Reformist Justices: En Banc Panels 
A. Summary Statistics 
Hanrei taikei ID 
Number 
LDP Justices Reform Justices LDP Majority 
votes 
Reform Majority 
votes 
28020801 6 9 4 9 
28011240 6 9 5 4 
28011109 6 9 6 9 
27827501 9 6 7 3 
28072380 12 3 12 3 
28060668 10 5 8 4 
28060669 10 5 6 3 
28051944 9 6 7 3 
28042712 9 6 9 6 
28042663 8 6 6 3 
28042637 8 6 6 3 
28033415 8 7 6 4 
 
B. Correlation Matrices 
1. LDP Appointed Justices 
 Majority 
vote 
Other 
LDP 
maj. % 
Reform 
maj. % 
 Dissent 
vote 
Oth. 
LDP 
diss. % 
Reform 
diss. % 
Majority 
vote 
1.00   Dissent 
vote 
1.00   
Other 
LDP  
maj. % 
-.04 (.70) 1.00  Other 
LDP  
diss. % 
-.05 (.61) 1.00  
Reform 
maj. % 
.25 (.01) .57 (.00) 1.00 Reform 
diss.% 
.25 (.01) .57 (.00) 1.00 
 
2. Reform Appointed Justices 
 Majority 
vote  
LDP 
maj. % 
Oth. 
Reform 
maj. % 
 Dissent 
vote  
LDP 
diss. %  
Oth. 
Ref. 
diss. % 
Majority 
vote 
1.00   Dissent 
vote 
1.00   
LDP  
maj. % 
.23 (.04) 1.00  LDP 
diss. % 
.23 (.04) 1.00  
Oth. Ref. 
maj. % 
.23 (.04) .37 (.00) 1.00 Oth. Ref. 
diss. % 
.24 (.04) .40 (.00) 1.00 
Notes: The dataset includes all en banc decisions published between January 1, 1993 
and December 31, 2002 that included either a dissenting or a concurring opinion. 
P-values in parentheses. 
Sources: See Table 1. 
E. Significance 
1. Introduction.  The reformist-appointed justices did not write 
more dissents. They did not write opinions that the commercial press 
found unusually newsworthy. They did not write opinions that 
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Secretariat editors shunned. They did not vote as a block. 
The data tell us all this. But they do not tell us why. In this 
regard, consider the following four possibilities. 
2. Judicial Ideology.  At one level, the data suggest that the 
justices (both LDP and reformist) may see their job as voting the law. 
Indulging their political preferences they perhaps think illegitimate. If 
they shun politics and follow the law, the results above follow. 
And at some level, the point is surely true. The Japanese public 
sees a judge’s job as enforcing the law. Probably, so do the judges. 
For a United States–Japan comparison, however, the point is 
also irrelevant. Like Japanese voters, American voters (other than 
law professors, one is tempted to add) similarly see the judicial job as 
that of voting the law.83 So does Judge Harry Edwards. When he 
writes what he does, he confirms an ethic as deeply held in the United 
States as in Japan. Many Japanese judges do indeed see political 
judging as improper—but so do many American judges. 
3. Strategic Voting.  The Justices’ public votes may also reflect 
private log-rolls. Rather than reflect their true preferences, the votes 
justices cast in public could also reflect the deals they cut in private. 
Because the deals involve multiple opinions (“You vote my way on 
this case; I’ll vote your way on the other”), how justices vote in any 
one case may say little about what they actually prefer.84 
This “strategic voting” could easily lie behind the hundreds of 
unanimous five-judge panel cases.85 Opinionated jurists do routinely 
disagree, after all—even in Japan, and even on nonpolitical questions. 
Poll any five jurists even from the same political party on any 174 
random legal questions, and they will seldom agree on 164. 
Whatever the case in the five-judge panel cases, the justices in 
the en banc cases86 are not cutting their deals within political blocks. 
Instead, if they make any explicit or implicit trades, they seem to 
 
 83. See For Republicans, Judicial Appointments Matter More than Iraq, RASMUSSEN 
REPORTS, May 21, 2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/election_ 
20082/2008_presidential_election/for_republicans_judicial_appointments_matter_more_than_ir
aq. 
 84. As a normative matter, vote trading on the bench is roundly condemned. E.g., Evan H. 
Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 
2333–79 (1999). 
 85. See infra Table 1, Panel A: Opinions Published by the Supreme Court. 
 86. See infra Table 3, Panel A: Summary Statistics. 
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make them on their own. After all, in most of these cases they split 
their votes within both the LDP and the reformist blocks. Just as 
legislative vote trading most often occurs within political parties,87 one 
might expect vote trading on the court to occur among ideological 
compatriots. At least in the en banc cases of the Japanese Supreme 
Court, however, that apparently does not occur: if justices swap votes, 
they swap them individually. 
4. Bland Cases.  Bear in mind that Japanese courts do not handle 
as politically charged a set of disputes as the courts in the United 
States. Japanese courts have not been as receptive to “innovative” 
claims as some American courts, and—as a result—litigants have not 
been as eager to bring them.88 This is endogenous to the character of 
the judges. As long as the LDP appointed the justices and they in turn 
managed the lower courts, politically inclined disputants justifiably 
saw the courts as unreceptive.89 Once Hosokawa and Murayama 
began appointing justices, however, they might have begun to 
consider bringing more of the claims we see in the United States. 
For the voting patterns in Table 3, however, all this is as 
irrelevant as it is true. The cases in Table 3 are not a random sample 
of cases. Instead, they are the cases heard en banc. By definition, they 
are the politically most highly charged disputes of all: cases in which 
one of the parties challenged the constitutionality of a statute or 
regulation. Judicial hostility to political litigation may help explain 
why the court hears so few disputes en banc. It does not explain why 
the justices voted as they did in the few cases they did hear en banc. 
5. Tenuous Hold.  Fundamentally, however, perhaps Hosokawa 
and Murayama never tried to change the character of the courts. As a 
LDP politician who had only recently quit the party, Hosokawa did 
not hold radically different policy preferences from his predecessors. 
Neither did the other politicians in his coalition. As a Socialist, 
 
 87. E.g., Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Patterns of Congressional Voting, 35 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 228, 265 (1991) (observing that the “maintenance of party coalitions apparently puts 
considerable constraint on the extent of internal party dissent”). 
 88. As Professor John Haley put it, “the justices have tended to defer to the political 
branches of government and the political process rather than craft constitutional mandates 
themselves.” JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 178 (1998). 
 89. In the LDP years, a “political” claim would tend to have been brought by an opposition 
litigant, if only because LDP supporters would have been more likely to enact their policy 
preferences in the Diet. Opposition supporters litigated because they found their legislative 
options foreclosed. 
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Murayama did hold other preferences, but he governed through a 
coalition that included the LDP.90 Within this coalition, he negotiated 
from a fundamentally weak position. In the July 1993 lower house 
election, the LDP had captured 223 of the 511 seats. His Socialists 
had taken only seventy.91 
Whatever the reason, Hosokawa and Murayama apparently put 
judicial change on low priority. Murayama probably lacked the power 
to push through change without jeopardizing other aspects of his 
program; Hosokawa may not even have wanted to change the courts. 
Both premiers apparently focused their attention elsewhere. They 
could not solidly have altered the courts except through supreme 
court appointments. But they had not finally appointed a majority of 
the justices until September 1995, and had not appointed the 
administratively crucial Chief Justice until November 1995.92 Two 
months later, the LDP re-took control. 
Given what Hosokawa and Murayama did (that is, given what 
they did not do), it stands to reason that the lower courts would not 
have changed. Given the tenuous reformist hold on government, 
jurists interested in radical change would have hesitated to join the 
courts. The government could not credibly have assured them a stable 
career, even had it tried. For the same reason, sitting judges with 
reformist preferences would have hesitated to shift their behavior 
toward reformist positions. The LDP could return, after all—as it 
soon did. The resurgent conservatives in the courts could then punish 
them in their careers, and the conservatives in the Diet would reverse 
their case law by statute. 
And even had Murayama hoped to change policy fundamentally, 
perhaps he would not have worked through the courts anyway. 
Rather than manipulate the courts, perhaps he tried to implement the 
 
 90. See ANDREW GORDON, A MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN: FROM TOKUGAWA TIMES TO 
THE PRESENT 323–24 (2d ed. 2009). Murayama abandoned two long-time Socialist positions—
opposition to the Self-Defense Force and the defense treaty with the United States—
immediately upon taking office. See Haruhiro Fukui & Shigeko N. Fukai, Japan in 1996: 
Between Hope and Uncertainty, 37 ASIA SURVEY 20, 26 (1997). 
 91. See GORDON, supra note 90, at 323 (explaining that the Socialists considered forming a 
coalition with the LDP as “a last best chance to share power”). 
 92. On the tenure of the justices, see ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 16, at 
357. Of course, the appointment of the chief justice himself was not indispensable. A prime 
minister intent on controlling the lower courts could privately assure a sitting Secretary General 
that he (the Secretary General) would be appointed to the supreme court on the next vacancy if 
but only if he administered the Secretariat in ways that implemented the prime minister’s 
political agenda. 
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Socialist agenda by statute. Perhaps he tried to shift the large 
bureaucratic apparatus (stacked with three decades of LDP 
appointees). And within the bureaucracy, perhaps he focused on 
those ministries most central to his Socialist reform.93 Among the 
ministries, the Ministry of Justice was most closely tied to the courts. 
Apparently, however, it was not a ministry about which he much 
cared. Over the course of his short tenure, he cycled three men 
through the minister of justice slot. All three were LDP politicians.94 
More basically, perhaps Hosokawa and Murayama thought they 
could shift the equilibrium in the lower court from political control to 
political independence. Suppose, for instance, that they thought they 
had ushered in an era of alternating political control. After all, writes 
historian Andrew Gordon, “in 1993, most observers predicted 
movement toward a two-party system. They expected a coherent rival 
to the LDP would emerge.”95 If so, perhaps the two dominant parties 
could choose mutually to keep their hands off the courts as a way of 
minimizing their losses while out of power.96 And in Japan, keeping 
their hands off the lower courts would necessarily entail a nonpolitical 
approach to supreme court appointments.97 
In the United States, though the Democrat and Republican 
governments politicize the judicial appointments process, they do 
keep sitting federal judges independent of themselves. By keeping the 
courts mutually independent, they reduce the political cost of 
electoral defeat. Because they expect to lose elections from time to 
 
 93. Consistent with that principle, he did save the Cabinet Secretariat, the Management & 
Coordination Agency, the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of Health & Welfare for Socialist 
politicians. Beyond those posts, though, he seems mostly to have focused on pork. At various 
times, he assigned Socialist politicians to the post office, the Ministry of Construction, and the 
Ministry of Land and Infrastructure. 
 94. Shigeto Nagano, the first justice minister, began his political career as a member of the 
LDP in the House of Councillors. See Profiles of Coalition Cabinet Ministers; Justice Minister: 
Shigeto Nagano, DAILY YOMIURI, Apr. 29, 1994, at 4. His successor, Tomoharu Tazawa, was a 
LDP member and the chairman of the upper house Rules and Administration Committee of the 
House of Councillors. See Profiles of Ministers in New Murayama Cabinet, DAILY YOMIURI, 
Aug. 9, 1995, at 5. Similarly, Tazawa’s successor, Hiroshi Miyazawa was a LDP House of 
Councillor member. See Tazawa Resigns as Justice Minister; Miyazawa Appointed as Successor, 
DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 10, 1995, at 1. 
 95. GORDON, supra note 90, at 323. 
 96. See GINSBURG, supra note 14, at 21–33; Hanssen, supra note 14, at 712; Ramseyer, 
supra note 14, at 741–42. 
 97. In the United States, the parties can politicize judicial appointments while still keeping 
the judicial administration politically independent. In Japan, the internal structure of the courts 
makes that distinction much harder to make. 
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time, they find the hands-off-the-courts strategy mutually beneficial. 
By contrast, the Japanese LDP had not kept the lower courts 
independent—but neither had it expected to lose power. If Hosokawa 
and Murayama thought that Japanese parties would begin to 
alternate in power,98 perhaps they hoped to shift the equilibrium in 
the lower courts from nonindependence to independence. Toward 
that end, perhaps they deliberately kept their hands off the courts. If 
this was in fact their calculation, they were wrong ex post—but that 
fact does not itself render the strategy necessarily irrational ex ante. 
CONCLUSION 
Japanese Supreme Court justices enjoy an institutional 
independence that their lower-court brethren lack. Lower-court 
judges work within a career structure that rewards them for following 
the political preferences of the long-time ruling LDP. That LDP 
briefly lost power in the mid-1990s, but for the lower-court judges 
little changed. 
Had the reformist premiers who temporarily replaced the LDP 
in the 1990s hoped to change the courts, they would have begun with 
the appointments to the supreme court. As the LDP-appointed 
justices retired, they would have named jurists who shared their 
reformist instincts. Precisely because of the institutional 
independence of the court, those changed appointments would have 
generated changed opinions: the new justices with reformist policy 
preferences would have written opinions different from those of their 
LDP predecessors. 
Yet the reformist-appointed justices did not write different 
opinions. They did not write more dissents. They did not write more 
newsworthy decisions. They did not write opinions that antagonized 
Secretariat editors. And they did not vote as a block. Apparently, the 
reformist premiers did not appoint justices with different political 
preferences from their predecessors. 
 
 98. See GORDON, supra note 90, at 323. 
